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Chapter 1 Introduction
1. As a coalition of human rights groups, we consider it our paramount priority to present
independent and reliable information to members of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (the Committee) in their consideration of the report on the implementation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in Hong Kong. As this
hearing will likely be the last before the reversion of the colony to China on July 1,
1997, weare compelled by a sense of urgency to alert the international community to the
peril which awaits the people of Hong Kong. Existing repressive laws must not be inherited
and used by the future government as a legal means of intensifying human rights violations
after 1997.
Implementation of the ICCPR
2. As subjects of a British colony, Hong Kong citizens have been blatantly deprived of
many of the fundamental rights enshrined in the ICCPR. Yet,for the past 150 years, this
disheartening reality has received few challenges from either the international community
or from the local community.
3. The protection of human rights under the ICCPR is limited when it isextended to Hong
Kong because of the imposition of excessive restrictions.(See Appendix A-1)
4. The Hong Kong of Government has failed to provide effective mechanisms to enforce the
ICCPR in Hong Kong, due to the following factors:
4.1 Although the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) which incorporates the provisions of the
ICCPR was enacted in 1991, the BORO applies to the publicsector, but not to private
sector. (See Appendix A-2)
4.2 The Hong Kong Government rejects the establishment of an independent human rights
commission. (See Appendix A-3)
4.3 The Hong Kong Government lacks any comprehensive and long-term plan to promote human
rights education.
4.4 Although the Hong Kong Government has recently speeded up the revisionof laws which
contravene the BORO, most revisions have been very limitedand give priority to maintaining
the status quo. Many laws which could havea serious impact on human rights violations are
yet to be revised, including the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, the Telecommunication
Ordinance, theCrime Ordinance, etc. (See para. 42 and 44 of this summary)
5. The Court of Final Appeal Bill (CFA) passed in July 1995, is not able to guarantee a
fair trial or the independence of the judiciary. The CFA Bill restricts the ratio of local
and overseas judges, and therefore curtails the appointment of overseas judges who are
experts in certain areas of law. Another clause of the CFA Bill states that the final
court of appeal should have no jurisdiction over any "act of state such as defense
and foreign affairs". It is worrisome that the clause on acts of state should beopen
to arbitrary interpretation by the Chinese authorities. (See AppendixA-4)
6. Although the SAR government can appoint judges after 1997, the continuity of the
rule-of-law may still be disrupted. Lu Ping, the head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office has indicated that there will be no guarantee of a "through-train" for
judges. That is, currently appointed judges may not be permitted to continue in this
capacity after 1997. Yet, Daniel Fung, the solicitor-general of Hong Kong raised no
concerns overthis issue. This is a blow to the morale of the judiciary. (See
AppendicesA-5, A-6, A-7)
7. Ordinary citizens cannot afford the high cost of taking their cases tocourt. The Legal
Aid Department, which is the only legal resource for peoplewith low incomes, is part of
the government administration. As a result,few human rights cases are taken up. (See
Appendices A-8 and A-9) Moreover, because the Legal Aid Department is a governmental
department, this relationship may lead to a conflict of interest and result in a lack of
independence particularly where the case relates to a governmental department. However,the
government refuses to separate the Legal Aid Department from the government administration
(See Appendix A-10)
8. The Legal Aid Department cannot consider certain cases effectively. This can be seen in
a New Territories clam land dispute which was delayed for 12 years, and the clams of 390
Vietnamese for compensation after theviolent Whitehead camp transfer. (See Appendices
A-11, A-12)
9. The report submitted by the Hong Kong Government to the Human Rights Committee is
limited by the selective presentation of positive aspects as well as an under-reporting of
serious human rights violations in Hong Kong.
10. The Hong Kong Government has a poor track record of observing the recommendations made
by various United Nations covenant bodies, including the Committeeon Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
China Factors
11. The BORO has been subject to consistent threats and attacks by the Chinese
authorities, beginning with the drafting stage. Hong Kong citizens were warned by Chinese
officials that the BORO would be revoked after 1997 onthe ground that it contravenes the
Basic Law.(See Appendix A-13)
12. The Chinese Government has set up a Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) in Hong Kong
to examine whether the amendments to legislation and administrative measures to ensure
adherence to the BORO, violate the Basic Law. The PWC has also threatened to repeal all
these amendments after 1997. (See AppendixA-14)
13. The disagreement between the two governments (Hong Kong and China) over the
interpretation of the Basic Law has been blamed for causing a
"confidencecrisis". For instance, the ambiguity relating to the granting of
"right to abode" to certain sector of the population may seriously jeopardizethe
right to travel. At present, the status of foreign passport holders is not clearly
defined, and they will not be treated as Chinese citizensafter 1997.
14. Hong Kong citizens are alarmed by definitions of terms in various articles which are
not elaborated upon, such as the "State of Emergency"in Article 18 of the Basic
Law, which reads: "In the event that theStanding Committee of the National People's
Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong
Special AdministrativeRegion which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the
controlof the government of the Region, decides that the Region is in a state of
emergency, the Central People's Government may issue an order applying therelevant
national laws in the Region." Accordingly, the national laws may override the BORO
which would then leave the provisions under the ICCPR unenforceable.(See Appendix A-15)
15. Historically, and not unknown to Hong Kong citizens, the term "turmoil"may
refer to any peaceful demonstrations or collective actions taken bycitizens for either
economic or political reasons. The sentencing of Hong Kong reporter Xi Yang to 12 years
imprisonment for releasing "Statesecrets" (which was in fact financial data),
has created a chilling effect. (See Appendix A-4.4)
Applicability of the ICESCR and the ICCPR after 1997
16. The Article 39 of the Basic Law states that the provisions of the ICCPRand the ICESCR
shall remain in force after 1997. However, there is no clearindication of what mechanisms
will enforce the provisions stipulated underthe ICCPR for Hong Kong through its domestic
laws. (See Appendix A-13)
17. Most importantly, there has been no concrete decision about the future monitoring
mechanisms of International Instruments, such as the ICCPR. This is because China is not a
signatory state party. In the recent Periodic Report, the British Government admits that
its efforts in this respect hasbeen limited to "briefing" the Chinese Government
about the obligation of reporting. However, it is not mentioned in the same report that
the Chinese Government has already flatly refused to submit reports to the United Nations.
In fact, Mr. Yeung Wah Ki, official from the Xinhua News Agency,(the de facto Chinese
Consul in Hong Kong) has publicly indicated that Chinawill not be under any obligations to
submit period reports to the Committee, precisely because China is not a Signatory state
party. (See Appendix A-16 and A-17)
18. China's insistence of a "national-specific" interpretation of human rights
and its hostility towards international monitoring of its human rights situations, are
notorious. The need to set up alternative measures, other than the reporting procedure, to
monitor the human rights situation of Hong Kong after 1997 is urgent and warrants
immediate attention from the Committee. Until all these issues have received sufficient
attention from the international community, and concrete solutions are laid down, there
will be no guarantee that the people of Hong Kong will enjoy fundamental freedoms and now
or beyond 1997.
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Chapter 2 Excessive Power of the Law Enforcement Agencies
Article 2: Effective Implementation and Remedies
19. The Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) is not a competent and independent body to
prevent police abuse of power. This can be shown by the extremely low rate of successful
complaints that have been filed with CAPO. Although the Independent Police Complaints
Council (IPCC), the CAPO watchdog, was made a statutory body, it is not empowered to
conduct investigations on its own. Rather, in order to decide on the cases investigated it
must rely heavily on reports prepared by CAPO. Yet, it is the composition of CAPO and the
degree of impartiality that is questioned by the public. CAPOis comprised entirely of
police officers. (See Appendices B-1 and B-2,see also Report ch. 2, para. 8-12)
20. The Legislative Council has passed a motion calling for the establishment of an
independent CAPO, however, the Hong Kong government has ignored the motion.
Article 7: No Torture or Inhumane Treatment
21. Article 3 of the BORO prohibits torture as well as cruel, pieces of legislation do not
protect Hong Kong citizens from police brutality The Crime (Torture) Ordinance defines and
criminalizes only the act of torture and does not cover police misconduct such as
intimidation or humiliation of suspects in an open manner and unnecessary use of
handcuffs. They also fail to protect against the abuse of identity checks and searches
which are authorized under Part IV A of the Immigration Ordinance (See Appendix B-3). In
reality, the government has never intended to charge any public
officer under the Crime (Torture) Ordinance. (See Appendices B-4 and B-5,see also Report
ch. 2, para. 20-24)
22. The highest number of complaints received since the enactment of the BORO are against
excessive use of violence by the police. The BORO has not deterred the police from abusing
its power.. (See Appendix B-6, seealso Report ch. 2, para. 3-6)
Article 9: Personal Liberty
23. Although a few pieces of legislation which concern how the police exercise its power
have been amended, there still remains ample room for police officers to act arbitrarily.
For example, the power to stop, question and detain people remains excessive. (See
Appendices B-7, B-8 and B-9, see also Reportch. 2 para. 7 and 16-19)
Article 17: Right to Privacy
24. Citizens' right to privacy is often violated by Law Enforcement Agencies.For example,
sensitive information has been accumulated by the government through departments such as
the Political Branch of the Police. The information collected includes name lists and
personal backgrounds of political and social activists, names of societies' members.
Moreover, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and other government
departments have extensively employed telephone bugging and other electronic spying
devices. Yet, there is no legislation to keep checks on and place restrictionson the
exercise of this power. Citizens are unaware of what conditions this power be used and is
there any special procedure in place when applying for permission to interception
telephones. (See Appendices B-11 and B-12)
25. The abuse of power of the police in searching and entering premiseshas seriously
disrupted the privacy and daily lives of local people, especially those who are
low-income. For example, on 23 April 1993, a massive door-to-doorsearch was carried out in
Ching Yan Temporary Housing Area in Ching Yi Island.The police had not applied for search
warrants, as required by law. This operation affected more than 2,000 residents in the
area. The police should have followed the proper procedure and applied for a court
warrant. (SeeAppendix B-13)
Chapter 3 Discrimination
Article 2: Effective Implementation and Remedies
26. In spite of recent Government initiatives to introduce legislation
concerningnon-discrimination in relation to sex and disability, there is an absence of
comprehensive legislation providing protection against discriminationon the grounds
referred to in article 2 of the ICCPR.
27. The Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO) has not been given a starting date and is
filled with exemptions which make it a "paper tiger".For example, the ordinance
has exempted the New Territories' small-house policy, which favours male indigenous
residents' inheritance rights. Ithas also exempted the housing allowance policy for civil
servants, whichis biased in favour of male civil servants. (See Appendices C-1 and C-2,see
also Report ch. 3, para. 5-8)
Article 3: Equal Rights of Men and Women
28. Age discrimination against women becomes increasingly serious in Hong Kong. Women aged
30 or above have greater difficulties finding jobs than those aged under 30. According to
a survey, 90% of the women respondents, who are aged 30 or above, experienced age
discrimination when they were looking for jobs. Another survey shows that almost 80% of
the advertisements for sales people are directed at women aged under 35 or 30. However,
the Government still insists that there is no strong evidence to prove that unemployment
amongst middle-aged women is due to age discrimination. (See Appendices C-3 and C-4, see
also Report ch. 3, para.14-19)
29. Domestic violence is also very serious in Hong Kong. The police consider domestic
violence as a family matter and often fail to immediately transferthese cases to the
appropriate department for further investigation andcounseling. Moreover, rape in marriage
is not a crime under local law. (SeeAppendix C-5, see also Report ch. 3, para. 20-25)
Article 26: Equal Protection Against Discrimination
30. The government claims that it fully supports the principle of equal opportunity for
all. However, the government sabotaged the Equal OpportunityBill (EOB), which is a more
comprehensive legislation against discriminationthan the SDO. The bill, introduced by an
independent legislator in July1994, proposed to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of
age, race, sexuality, trade union membership and political affiliation. One of the tactics
usedby the Government was to send a 23-page document criticizing the bill to a selected
group of legislator at the last moment to persuade them not to vote for the bill. (See
Appendix C-6, see also Report ch. 3, para. 9-10)
31. Government figures show that there are about 130,000 foreign domestic helpers in Hong
Kong -- 99% are women. The most controversial policy,and the one which causes foreign
domestic helpers greatest hardship, is the two-week rule. The rule remains even though the
United Nations Committeeon Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recommended its repeal, as
wellas review of the employment conditions of foreign domestic helpers to ensure the full
enjoyment of their rights. The government has yet to take actionon either recommendation.
32. Although homosexuality was decriminalized two years ago, there is noother provision
protecting homosexuals from being discriminated againstby the government or the private
sector. In other words, if a homosexual person is terminated by the employer because of
his/her sexual orientation, he/she has nowhere to file a complaint.
33. Persons who are HIV positive or who have AIDS are deprived the right to education as
most schools in Hong Kong are reluctant to admit them. Many hospitals are unwilling to
take AIDS patients. Those who die from AIDS often do not receive proper funeral services
after death. The educational programs conducted by the Hong Kong Government have used fear
tactics as a means of preventing AIDS rather than promoting a caring attitude toward those
who are HIV positive or who have AIDS (See Appendices C-7 and C-8, see alsoReport ch. 3,
para. 43-48)
34. Disabled persons in Hong Kong still face discrimination in the acquisition of
education, employment opportunities and daily facilities, such as transportation.(See
Appendix C-9, see also Report ch. 2, para. 53-59)
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Chapter 4 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong
Article 7: No Torture or Inhumane Treatment
35. Use of excessive violence and impose inhumane treatment on Vietnamese during camp
transfer sand forced repatriation are not uncommon. In several incidents, including 7
April 1994 (Whitehead) and 9 December 1994, camp transfers from High Island to Victoria
Prison, 20 and 21 May 1995 camp transferfrom Whitehead to High Island detention centre,
3,000 tear gas bombs wereused. Many Vietnamese, especially women and children were
reported injured by tear gas and through the violence employed by officers (See
AppendicesD-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4, see also Report 4, para. 2-9)
Article 9: Personal Liberty
36. Although the Government has released a number of Vietnamese (approximately130) at the
end of 1994, some have been redetained even though the Vietnamese authorities have not yet
decided to accept them. (See Report ch. 4, para.11-13)
37. About 1,800 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong may face repatriation after1997 because
no western countries are willing to accept them even though they were granted refugee
status. (See Appendix D-5, see also Report ch.4, para. 10)
Article 14: Right to Fair and Public Hearing
38. Although the Vietnamese are entitled in theory to have legal aid, inpractice, few have
access to this service. 390 Vietnamese claimed compensation after the Whitehead raid in
1994, yet the Legal Aid Department still hasnot yet taken up their case. (See Appendix
A-9, see also Report ch. 4, para.25)
Right 20: Rights of Children
39. The right to education of Vietnamese children is denied. In order to encourage
voluntary repatriation. All secondary schools in detention centreswere closed in recent
months. (See Report ch. 4, para. 26-27)
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Chapter 5 Right to Privacy
Article 17: Right to Privacy
40. The collecting of data for the purpose of national security, defence and international
relations, especially after 1997, is exempt under the Personal Data (privacy) Bill. The
Bill cannot provide adequate protection of personal data because the terms "national
security" and "internationalrelations" may be arbitrarily interpreted. (See
Appendices E-1 andE-2, see also Report ch. 5, para. 3-7)
41. Although citizens have right of access to personal records, information classified as
confidential and sensitive (such as information about socialactivists) are prohibited from
access. (See Appendices E-3 and E-4, seealso Report ch. 5, para. 8-9)
42. A number of laws and administrative regulations that contravene the right to privacy
have not been revised. These include the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Section 14, 15,
17A(2) and (3) (See Appendix E-5), Housing Ordinance Section 22 (See Appendix E-6) which
empowers government officials with the right to enter and search private premises without
a warrant (See also Report ch. 5, para. 11-16); the Post Office Ordinance Section 23 (See
Appendix E-7); Prison Rules Section 47 (See Appendix E-8), Immigration (Vietnamese
Migrants) (Detention Centres) Rules Section 26 (See Appendix E-9); and the
Telecommunication Ordinance Section33 (See Appendix E-10) which gives the government the
power to intercept telephone lines and the mail. (See also Report ch. 5, para.
17-26)
43. The seizure of 9,000 patients' in Dr. Siu Kin-ying's clinic shows the draconian powers
of the Inland Revenue Department. It also reveals the absolute lack of respect and
sensitivity for human rights by judiciary. (See AppendixE-11, see also Report ch. 5, para.
41-43) The magistrate who issued the warrant in this case said that "he might not
have been aware of some minor areas in the BORO when making his decision based on the
information provided in the department's application." (See Appendix E-12)
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Chapter 6 Freedom of Expression and the Right to Peaceful Assembly
Article 19: Freedom of Expression
44. Although the BORO guarantees the peoples' right to freedom of expression,there still
exists many laws in Hong Kong that contravene this right, suchas the Emergency Regulations
Ordinance (See Appendix F-1), the Telecommunication Ordinance Section 33 (See Appendix
E-9), the Crime Ordinance Section 2 and9 (See Appendix F-2) and the Official Secret Act.
45. In recent years, the Chinese Government has been trying to influence the independence
of Hong Kong's media through economic means and by controlling sources of information. For
example, it gives information to congenial papers only and prohibits journalists of
"unfriendly" newspapers from gathering information in mainland China.
Self-censorship of the Hong Kong government and the media has become alarmingly evident in
recent years.(See Appendices F-3 and F-4)
46. Hong Kong people believe that the media should act as an
independent"watchdog" to monitor the work of the government. However, in
mainland China, the media is considered a propaganda machine of the state. After 1997, the
Chinese government may not respect this independent role of Hong Kong's media and allow
increased intervention of the media. (See Appendices F-5 and F-6)
47. At present, there is no legislation in Hong Kong that protects citizens' right of
access to information. Although the Official Secrets Act 1989 reduced the areas of
criminal offense when government information is leaked, it does not specify what kind of
information a citizen has the right to know.In other words, the government has no
obligation to provide citizens with information outside a particular area. Many
non-governmental organizations have repeatedly pressed the government to enact the
Accessto Information Bill, which was introduced by a private legislator. However,the bill
was rejected by the governor. (See Appendix F-6)
Article 21: Right to Peaceful Assembly
48. The police force of Hong Kong is vested with excessive power under the Public Order
Ordinance to control any public assembly or procession. The recent revision to the Public
Order Ordinance did not curtail the power of the police. Under the Section 7, without 7
days' notification to the police, any public assembly or procession exceeding 50 persons
will be considered as unauthorized assembly and therefore a criminal offence.(See appendix
F-7) The police can ban any spontaneous protest exceeding 50 persons evenif it is
peaceful. The minimum number of participants required for prior notification is too small
and thus should be increased from 50 to at least 200.
49. The Public Order Ordinance gives the police extensive power to imposerestrictions on
the conduct of any public assembly and procession such as:the extent to which speech or
music can be amplified or broadcast, the route of procession, etc. (See Appendix F-8) The
police can also determine that an assembly of people as unlawful if persons so assembled
commit a breachof the peace. Persons take part in the assembly shall be guilty of the
offence of unlawful assembly. The meaning of "breach of peace"is too broad and
can be abused to suppress the rights of people. (See AppendixF-9)
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Chapter 7 Right to Political Participation (Article 25)
A Discriminatory and Unequal Electoral System
50. Only 20 among the 60 members of the Legislative Council are directly elected by
universal suffrage. The other 30 members are elected by functional constituencies and 10
members are elected by an election committee. (SeeReport ch. 7, para. 1-7)
51. The electoral system of functional constituencies is unequal and unfair. First, the
concept of a functional constituency, which gives additional voting rights to people,
allows specific occupational or professional sectors in society to elect Legislative
Councilors. This violates the principle of non-discrimination. It means that all
housewives, retired persons, the unemployed and students over 18 are denied the right to
vote in the functional constituencies.Second, this electoral system is unfair in that
votes of the functional constituency carry more weight than votes obtained through direct
election. Yet, more legislators are elected through the functional constituency even
though it has few representatives than those elected through universal suffrage.(See
Appendix G-1, see also Report ch. 7, para. 8-14)
52. In the September 1995 election, 10 members of the Legislative Councilwere elected by
an Election Committee. The Election Committee is comprise of all directly-elected district
board members, about 350 people. It is still unfair to give additional vote to these
people although they are directly elected at the district level. (See Report ch. 7, para.
15-16)
53. The Electoral Provisions Ordinance Section 11, 18 and 19 (See AppendixG-2) contain
many unreasonable requirements on voters and candidates that violate the right to vote and
the right of Hong Kong people to stand for election. All these laws should be revised to
remove unreasonable requirements including: a 10 year residency requirement for nomination
as candidate;the disqualification of former criminals for nomination as candidates, and in
some cases from registration as electors; the disqualification for nominationas candidates
those who are bankrupt; and depriving prisoners of the right to vote. (See Appendices G-3
and G-4, see also Report ch. 7, para. 17-31)
54. The legal safeguards for the equal voting rights of village women to elect
representatives of their villages are inadequate. (See Appendix G-5,see also Report ch. 7,
para. 32-34)
Undemocratic political system
55. The political system of Hong Kong is undemocratic in that Hong Kong people do not have
the right to elect the Governor or the top officials who hold the power to make policies
which affect their daily lives. The Executive holds almost absolute power. Restricted by
the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, the Legislative Council only has the power to
monitor the work and finance of the government, and to approve or not approve the bills
proposed by the officials. Although Legislative Councilors can table private bills, they
need the permission of the Governor if their bills are to impose any charges to the
revenue of the government. Furthermore, formany years the Legislative Council has passed
numerous resolutions demanding the government to improve certain government policies.
However, as these resolutions did not have binding power, the government acted on very few
of them. (See Appendix G-6, see also Report ch. 7 para. 35-43)
Undemocratic structure remains after 1997
56. The monopoly of power by the Executive is preserved in the Basic Law.The Chief
Executive of the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be elected by an
election committee comprised of 800 members insteadof universal suffrage. The method of
selecting the committee's members is still unknown. For the election of the first Chief
Executive, it is very likely that all members of the election committee will be appointed
by the Chinese Government. (See Appendix G-7) According to the Basic Law, only in the year
2003 will there be 30 directly elected seats, consisting of half of members of the
Legislative Council. There is no guarantee of universal suffrage for all Legislative
Councilors in the future. (See Appendix G-8,see also Report ch. 7, para. 44-45)
57. The National People's Congress of China has decided to terminate the present district
boards, the two regional councils and the Legislative Councilon 30 June 1997. To fill the
power vacuum which will occur on 1 July 1997, the Chinese Government proposed to set up a
provisional legislative assembly to carry out the function of the Legislative Council
before the electionof the new Legislative Council. The proposal drew serious criticisms
from many Hong Kong people. First, up until now the method of constituting this body is
remains unknown. It is highly possible that all members of the provisional legislative
assembly will be appointed by the Chinese Government. Second,under the present proposal,
the power of the provisional legislative assembly will be very broad and its duration will
be up to one year. It is totally undemocratic to allow a body that has no delegation of
power by the Hong Kong people to decide on wide range of policy for Hong Kong. (See
AppendicesG-9 and G-10, see also Report ch. 7 para. 46-49)
Recommendations
58. The British Government should submit a supplementary report on Hong Kong to the Human
Rights Committee for consideration in a special hearingby the end of 1996. The report
should focus on a) the applicability of the ICCPR and its reporting procedure after 1997,
and b) amendments and repealsof bills contradicting ICCPR.
59. The British Government should incorporate all provisions enshrined in international
human rights instruments that have been ratified by the United Kingdom into domestic
legislation immediately so as to safeguard human rights in Hong Kong. All modifications
and reservations should be removed to ensure that the provisions are fully put into
practice.
60. The Hong Kong Government should repeal all laws that violate the ICCPR as soon as
possible. The process of amending relevant legislation must be accelerated.
61. The British Government should accord high priority in the agenda of the Joint Liaison
Group to human rights issues such as applicability of multilateral treaties, conflicts
over interpretations of the Basic Law and BORO, etc.
62. The British Government should discuss with the Chinese Government amendments to the
Basic Law, and to stipulate that starting from the first term, the Chief Executive of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and all membersof the Legislative Council shall be
elected by universal suffrage.
63. The British Government should discuss with the Chinese Government withdrawing the
decision to dissolve the recently elected three-tiers representative bodies on 1st July
1997.
64. The British Government should amend the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions to
remove the prerequisite of prior approval by the Governor of Hong Kong for introducing
private bills by the Legislative Councilors. Also the British Government should add that
if the Governor has vetoed a bill passed by theLegislative Council, the bill shall be
effective if the Legislative Council passes the bill again by two-third votes.
65. The Hong Kong Government should set up an independent Human Rights Commissionto
monitor the human rights situation, investigate human rights complaints,and coordinate
human rights education.
66. According to Article 2 of the ICCPR, the Hong Kong Government should introduce a
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation to make it unlawful for public authorities
and private persons to discriminate against personson various grounds, including sex,
sexuality, family status, disability, race, trade union membership, etc.
67. The Hong Kong Government should provide sufficient and appropriate training for the
police force to handle cases of domestic violence and sexual assault.The government should
also set up a specific working committee or support center to be coordinated with various
departments and other social serviceorganizations to provide legal advice, thorough
medical service and comprehensive counseling services for victims of domestic
violence or sexual assault. Moreover, the government should enact
a legislation criminalizing rape in marriage.
68. The Hong Kong Government should abolish the "two-week rule"and review the
employment conditions of foreign domestic helpers to provide the full enjoyment of their
rights.
69. The Hong Kong Government should allocate more resources to provide full education and
employment opportunities for persons who are disabled. Also,the Hong Kong Government
should take measures to ensure the acquisition of daily facilities for disabled persons,
such as public transportation and access to and use of buildings.
70. The Hong Kong Government should establish an independent Office, toreceive and
investigate complaints not only against police. It would also address complaints against
officers of other disciplinary forces including the Immigration Department, the
Correctional Services Department, the Customs and Excise Department, and the Independent
Commission Against Corruption.
71. The Hong Kong Government should amend the Crime (Torture) Ordinance to include
inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment as crime and to extend its jurisdiction to
all official authorities and private institutions.
72. The Hong Kong Government should stop using violence in operations regarding Vietnamese
asylum seekers during camp transfers and repatriation.
73. The Hong Kong Government should take immediate steps to ensure the right to education
for Vietnamese children.
74. The Privacy Commissioner should be given the power to monitor the use of telephone
interception by government bodies, and to receive and investigate complaints about
telephone interception.
75. The Hong Kong Government should introduce an access to information legislation to
establish the legal right of the Hong Kong public to seek and obtain information from the
government and governmental related agencies.
76. The Hong Kong Government should introduce legislation to ensure the equal voting
rights of village women in village elections.
77. The Hong Kong Government should separate the present Legal Aid Department from the
administration so that it become an independent body.
78. The Hong Kong Government should amend the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance in
accordance with the article 82 of the Basic Law so that the Court of Final Appeal
"may as required invite judges form other common law jurisdictions to sit on the
Court of Final Appeal."
79. The Hong Kong Government should amend the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance to restrict
the meaning of "act of state" to defense and foreign affairs.
80. The competent authorities in Hong Kong responsible for continuing legal education for
the judiciary should take active steps to ensure that Hong Kong judges are appropriately
continuously updated on issues and developments in international human rights law. (This
is one of the recommendation of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to
the British Government at the 53rd meeting held on 7 December 1994.)
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