Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China in the light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) October 1999

Introduction
The Rule of Law After The Hand-Over
* The "Big Spender" Trial
* Decision not to prosecute publishing tycoon Sally Aw Sian

* Right of Abode case and NPC interpretation

Right to Political Participation
Article 25: Right to political participation
* An unfair electoral system

* An "executive-dominated" political system

Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association

Article 18: Freedom of Religion

Article 19: Right to Expression

Article 21: Right to Peaceful Assembly

* Freedom of Expression

National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance

Blocking the Visits of Dissidents to Attend Conference

Former Taiwan official failed to attend academic conference

Interference with mass media: Role of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK)

* Peaceful Assembly
Police Tactics and Conditions imposed on public rallies
Prosecution of World Bank Protesters
Public Order Ordinance and Societies Ordinance

* Religious Freedom
The Pope was ban from visiting Hong Kong

* Freedom of Association
Decline registration of Forget Not June Fourth

Police Brutality and Abusive Use of Police Power
* Torture Inflicted by Police Officers

* High-volume Music to Drown Protestors on Hand-over Night
* Lack of Independent Complaint Mechanism

Family Reunion

Recommendations

Introduction

1. This report is prepared by the Hong Kong Human Rights Commission, a coalition of non-governmental organizations actively involved in the promotion of human rights in Hong Kong. Found in 1988, our group is composed of religious, women, community, labour and students organizations.

2. As this is the first hearing on the ICCPR report submitted by the HKSAR government, we consider it of paramount importance that information and analysis from non-official sources be provided for the consideration of the Committee, to ensure a comprehensive and balanced presentation of the human rights situations after the reversion of sovereignty.

3. After years of efforts by human rights groups both at local and international levels, we are much encouraged that the People's Republic of China has finally become a signatory state to the two covenants. Before the transfer of sovereignty, the issue over the continue obligation of human rights reporting by HKSAR government had occupied the central stage of previous hearings by the treaty bodies. Unfortunately, the emphasis on reporting obligation distracted focus on the outgoing government's failure to pursue recommendations by the Committee in the concluding observations. Thus, in this report, we wish to draw the committee's attention not only to the content of the state's report, but to scrutinize the follow up action after the release of concluding remarks. Without a genuine concern over the implementation of recommendations by the committee, the function of reporting would be ,as in the pre-transfer era, reduced to diplomatic rituals, and not a mechanism for the protection of human rights

4. With the understanding that other NGOs will also submit reports to the Committee, this report will provide a review of selected human rights which have been closely followed by our organization as these rights are in the danger of gradual erosion after the transfer. In the following sections, we will present our observation of four major issues, which include: (1) the rule of law; (2) the right to political participation; (3) freedom of expression, assembly and association, (4) police brutality and abusive use of police power; (5) family reunion and (6) recommendations

The Rule of Law After The Hand-Over

5. On 30 June 1999, some six hundred members of the legal community of SAR,
including solicitors, barristers, academics, law students and para-legals, took part in the "Legal Profession's Walk" in response to the National People's Congress ("NPC") interpretation (or re-interpretation as some would call it) of the Basic Law a few days ago in relation to the right of abode issues concerning mainland born migrants coming to Hong Kong. The publicized motto of the walk is to show support for the rule of law and respect for the Court of Final Appeal, but the unprecedented imagery of lawyers having to take their cause to the street sends a strong signal to everyone that the Rule of Law of the SAR is under great strain these days, un-paralleled in the remembered history of Hong Kong.

6. Whether the independence of the judiciary system and the rule of law can survive the "one country, two systems" experiment had been the major concern of Hong Kong citizens and international community before and after the transfer of sovereignty. The fear that the common law system may be eventually abandoned under Chinese rule could be attributable to the stark difference between the values and procedures of the Common Law tradition of Hong Kong and the Chinese legal system. Unfortunately, during the past two years, confidence in the rule of law had been substantially jeopardized as controversial cases were widely publicized one after another. The cases are presented below as an illustration of the bleak situation.

* The "Big Spender" trial
7. Cheung, a Hong Kong citizen and a notorious gang boss known as "Big Spender", was executed after a trial at Guangzhou, mainland China. He was charged and executed for crimes committed in Hong Kong such as kidnapping Hong Kong tycoons. To the Hong Kong citizens, the case signify a loss of the legal autonomy of the HKSAR, which would result in more Hong Kong citizens be regularly tried on the
mainland for crimes committed in the SAR. Throughout the incident the SAR Government had not made any attempt to request for the transfer of the suspect back to Hong Kong for trial. If this case can be said to have a mainland element in the finding that the planning and preparation part of the crimes took place in the mainland, the "Li Yuhui" trial which came shortly afterwards clearly showed that anybody can be tried in mainland China for crimes entirely committed in the SAR and be subject to death penalty which Hong Kong has abolished.


* Decision not to prosecute publishing tycoon Sally Aw Sian
8. The decision against prosecuting publishing tycoon Sally Aw Sian, a close friend of the Chief Executive and a prominent figure in the local pro-China circle for a conspiracy to defraud had weakened citizens' confidence in the legal system. The official explanation issued by Secretary of Justice could hardly convince Hong Kong citizens that the decision was proper and that the rule of law built upon the premise of equality before the law had been upheld.

9. Similar incidents such as failure by the Government to prosecute Xinhua, former official agency of China in Hong Kong for an apparent breach of data privacy laws and the Police's wanton action to remove Taiwanese flags celebrating the Taiwanese "double-tenth" holiday had also raised concerns among local human rights groups.

* Right of Abode case and NPC interpretation
10. The first few pieces of legislation passed by the Provisional Legislature of the SAR were to amend the Immigration Ordinance so as to make the category of people, who is residing in mainland China and who according to the Basic Law should enjoy the right of abode in the Region for being born of a Hong Kong citizen parent, a much restricted category and their exercise of the right a controlled exercise of the Administration. This was indeed the first signal that the Administration might be thinking differently from what many others in the SAR did of the Rule of Law, and as a result a series of litigation were sparked to challenge the legality of these amendments. The test case representing a number of similar applications finally came before the Court of Final Appeal ("CFA"), the highest judicial authority of the SAR and one that was vested with the interpretative power and the final adjudicative power of and under the Basic Law.

11. Judgment handed down by the CFA in January 1999 was first hailed as a victory and a cornerstone for the Rule of Law as it in un-ambivalent language spelled out the jurisdiction of the courts of the Hong Kong SAR in interpreting the Basic Law and also clearly defined the respective duties and powers of the CFA and the NPC or its Standing Committee ("NPCSC") under the Basic Law. Guiding principles were laid down for the interpretation of the provisions of the Basic Law, of remarkable importance was the court's confirmation of the constitutional status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (as applied through The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance) in the review and construction of local legislation. All these logically and conclusively led to the striking out of those restrictions not found in the Basic Law text but appeared in the amended legislation on the qualification for and enjoyment of the right of abode of the said category of people.

12. What followed, however, are first, there came the attacks from the former Mainland drafting members of the Basic Law, focusing on CFA's statement that CFA had jurisdiction to declare acts of NPC and NPCSC invalid for inconsistency with the Basic Law, and this resulted in the SAR Government seeking clarification from CFA of its own judgment after the same had been concluded. On 26 February 1999, CFA did accede to the request and took the exceptional course to issue clarification saying that it never intended to question the status of NPC and NPCSC as highest organs of state power and that their acts consistent with the Basic Law must be upheld; second, the Government announced "interim" figures saying that as a result of CFA's Judgment an "additional" 1.67 million mainland people were given right of abode within the next 10 years and the Administration told the Legislative Council and public that unimaginable consequences would result if these people were to come within the next few years, thus arousing grave public concern and divided opinions over the settlement of mainland people in the SAR; third, the Secretary for Justice visited Beijing in May 1999 and then on 18 May 1999 the Government announced "The Solution" for the problem: seeking NPCSC to clarify the "true legislative intent" (in English) "original legislative intent" (in Chinese), declaring that Standing Committee "knows best what the true (original) legislative intent was and is the most authoritative body to interpret the law", this was done notwithstanding that no mechanism exists under the Basic Law for the SAR Government to seek interpretation from NPC or NPCSC; finally, there came on 26 June 1999 the interpretation of NPCSC contrasting the conclusions reached by the CFA. According to the Basic Law, when the NPCSC had made an interpretation, the courts of SAR have to follow such interpretation, thus the Judgment of the CFA is in effect reversed. At the same time, the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice repeatedly on public occasions dubbed the opposing voice as damaging the reputation of Hong Kong by despatching negative signals on the local situation of the Rule of Law.

13. As the Government has failed to give any assurance that it would not seek NPC interpretation on the Basic Law again, there are already suggestions that the "burning flag" case (prosecution laid against protesters burning the national flag) and the Heung Yee Kuk's challenge to the voting rights of indigenous villages should also go to the NPC for an interpretation. Fears that the courts will become less important following the reinterpretation of the Basic Law are becoming a reality.


14. If the concept of the Rule of Law means, as Director of Public Prosecutions Grenville Cross SC once put it, "the absence of arbitrary action by the Government, everyone being equal before the law, an independent judiciary, and the rights of citizen clearly defined", the Hong Kong SAR had apparently failed to live up to any of these in the first two years after the hand-over.

Right to Political Participation

Article 25: Right to political participation

15. In Hong Kong, the right to political participation is seriously violated by an unfair electoral system and an "executive-dominated" political system.

* An unfair electoral system
16. The Chief Executive is the head of the HKSAR. However, the citizens of Hong Kong are deprived of the right to choose their top leader. Instead, the first Chief Executive was recommended by a 400-member Selection Committee to the Central People's Government for appointment. The Selection Committee was established by the Preparatory Committee which comprised 150 members appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. According to the Basic Law, the next Chief Executive will be elected by an 800-member Election Committee in 2002, not the people of Hong Kong by universal and equal suffrage.

17. Serious retrogressions occurred concerning the right of Hong Kong people to elect their representatives after the handover. A Provisional Legislative Council replaced the partly directly elected Legislative Council between July 1997 to May 1998. The Provisional Legislative Council was an undemocratic body that could not represent the people of Hong Kong. All its members were elected by the same 400-member Selection Committee which recommended the Chief Executive. The first Legislative Council election in May 1998 returned 60 members with only one-third of them elected by geographical constituencies through direct elections. Half of the members were elected by functional constituencies which granted more voting rights to people of the professional and business sectors. The remaining 10 members were elected by an 800-member Election Committee which composition replicated the pattern of functional constituencies.

18. In its concluding observations on the last report submitted by the Hong Kong British government, the Human Rights Committee clearly stated that the concept of functional constituencies constituted a violation of articles 2, paragraph1, 25(b) and 26 of the ICCPR, as it gave undue weight to the business community and discriminated among voters on the basis of property and functions. The response of the Hong Kong government in its present report (paragraph 461(b)) confirms that this comment is right. The Hong Kong government, in fact, admits that the concept of functional constituencies is discriminatory on the basis of the "importance" of the business sectors in the community. The Hong Kong government also argues that the present electoral system is transitional. However, only after the year 2007 will such unfair electoral system be amended pending the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all members of the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive.1 Thus, there is no guarantee that the election of all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage will be realized.

19. Moreover, the Hong Kong government has decided to abolish the two regional representative bodies: the Urban Council and the Regional Council. These two municipal councils are responsible for managing environment, public health and recreation facilities. Before the hand-over, over half of their members were directly elected in 1995.2 Also the government has enacted legislation to reintroduce appointed seats in the District Councils which will replace the District Boards. The District Boards were fully elected by elections in geographic constituencies in 1995. As a result, the right of Hong Kong people to elect their representatives will be further infringed.

20. Finally, the discriminatory practices of rural elections deprive the right of non-indigenous villagers and women to elect their village representatives on the basis of descent and gender.

* An "executive-dominated" political system
21. The Basic Law grants enormous power to the Chief Executive, but seriously restricts the members of the Legislative Council from carrying out their responsibilities to supervise the executive and take policy initiatives. This results in the formation of an "executed-dominated" political system that the executive disregards the will and the participation of Hong Kong people in policy making and implementation.

22. First, the Annex II of the Basic Law on the "Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR and Its Voting Procedures" stipulates that the passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members of the Legislative Council requires a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present. One group is the members returned by functional constituencies. Another group is the members returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections and by the Election Committee. However, the passage of bills introduced by the government only requires a simple majority vote of the members of the Legislative Council present. As a result, it becomes far more difficult for the passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members, which needs only a quarter of the members present in one of the group to vote them down, than the passage of bills introduced by the government. Given the domination of the members returned by functional constituencies in the Legislative Council, such voting procedures greatly handicaps the members of the Legislative Council in supervising the government and making it accountable to the public.

23. Second, Article 74 of the Basic Law prevents the members of the Legislative Council from taking policy initiatives. The article stipulates that the members are required to get the consent of the Chief Executive in introducing member's bills which relate to public expenditure, political structure or operation of the government. In other words, the Chief Executive is empowered to block the introduction of members bills which have implications on all government policies. The worse is that the Hong Kong government interprets that the Article 74 should also apply to the amendments introduced by the members to the government bills. The government is pushing the Legislative Council to follow such an interpretation. If the government succeeds to do so, the Legislative Council will become a rubber stamp of government policies.

Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association

Article 18: Freedom of Religion
Article 19: Right to Expression
Article 21: Right to Peaceful Assembly

24. At a superficial level, complaints pertaining to economic policy tend to overshadow concerns over civil liberties after the hand-over of sovereignty, yet citizens of Hong Kong, had in the past two years witnessed a gradual erosion of rights to freedom of expression and assembly. A number of issues relating to the exercise of freedom of expression clearly revealed that the SAR Government has adopted the Beijing Government's policy on freedom of expression as its own standards. Constraints imposed on the autonomy of the SAR government has converted the "one country, two system" policy into slogan rather than a practice in reality. Examples also illustrated that the Hong Kong mass media has been subject to pressure and constraints in their reporting as well as expression of critical analysis in matter relating to Chinese authority.In the following, we will provide cases to substantiate the above remark.

* Freedom of Expression

National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance
25. Two Hong Kong citizens, Ng Kung-siu and Lee Kin-yun, were accused of defacing the national flag in a peaceful pro-democracy protest on January 1, 1998. They waved a Taiwan flag and defaced a national flag and a SAR flag during the procession organised by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. At the end of the procession, they put the three flags on an iron bar outside the Central Government Offices. They were not deter by the police then, but were charged under section 7 of the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance and Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance one month later. The two men were convicted on May 18, 1999. Section 7 stated that "a person who desecrates the national flag or national emblem by publicly and willfully burning, mutilating, scrawling on, defiling or trampling on it commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine at level 5 and to imprisonment for 3 years". The two ordinances were passed by the Provisional Legislative Council and became effective on July1, 1997.


26. In the ruling,the magistrate stated that riot may break out due to burning or desecrating the national flag in public and that the government could not wait until a riot broke out before prohibiting it by law. Thus he perceived that judgement according to the ordinances which restricted the right to freedom of expression, was justifiable and necessary for the protection of the public order. Lee and Ng have appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

27. For some, the act of defacing a national flag is unacceptable as it symbolizes history, culture or racial unity of a country. Yet, when the act is viewed in a broader context of opinion expression and raising public concerns, then its prohibition constitutes a violation of the rights to expression. In a free society, expressions of opinions through different ways should be tolerated and respected. Moreover, restrictions on freedom of expression could only be imposed if they were necessary to protect public order, public health or moral standards. In the legal system of Hong Kong many other laws are available to maintain public order. The existence of laws, such as the flag ordinance and thus the ruling of the above case, which contradicts Article 19 is not justifiable.

Blocking the Visits of Dissidents to Attend Conference
28. In April 1999, 11 pro-democracy activists who were regarded as dissidents by the People's Republic of China (PRC) government, including Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng were rejected in their application for visas by the Immigration Department. They were invited to attend a conference to be held at the University of Hong Kong, organized by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (the Alliance) and the university student unions. The theme of the conference was to study the prospects of democratic development in China. Speakers were invited to review, analyze and share experiences. As the goal of the conference is mainly for academic exchange involving scholars, students, journalists and activists, to block the 11 activists from entering Hong Kong means an infringement of the right to expression and as well as academic freedom.

29. Earlier in March 1999, in response to queries by the press during an official trip to Beijing the Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee asserted that SAR immigration policy remained independent of the central Government and the SAR government needed not seek Beijing's advice on visas for dissidents. Immigration authorities had also assured the Alliance in March that the applications of the activists would be processed on their merits and that HK SAR still enjoyed autonomy in the exercise of local policy. However, the Immigration Department determined to turn down the visa applications finally.

30. If the SAR government was not following the instruction of Beijing, then it was exercising "self-restraint" in order not to offend the Beijing authority over this controversial issue, to the extent of violating rights recognized in ICCPR.

Former Taiwan official failed to attend academic conference
31. In August 1999, the SAR Government rejected a visa for Chang King-yuk, a former chairman of the cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council. The former senior Taiwan official intended to attend an academic conference on the cross-strait relations organized by the University of Hong Kong. Immigration officials declined to give any reason on this rejection.

32. Earlier in May 1998, Chang visited Hong Kong in a personal capacity when he was still chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, thus the rejection to grant him a visa in August ,1999 was attributed to the tension between mainland and Taiwan arising out of Lee Ten-hui's controversial speech on "State-to-state relations" in July 9 this year during an interview with a German journalist.

33. The denial of visa to a Taiwanese to attend conference in Hong Kong by the Hong Kong immigration department in the wake of tension between Taiwan and mainland raised question again regarding the "one country two system principle". In compliance with Article 19, Hong Kong SAR Government should not restrict the expression of public opinion on unification issues in Hong Kong, even though it is considered a sensitive and controversial issue by the Beijing government.

Interference with mass media: Role of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK)
34. Earlier in March 1998, Xu Simin, a Hong Kong delegate to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference had made a remark regarding the role of RTHK as a government-owned broadcaster which aroused concerns from public. In June 1999, Xu renewed his attacks and described "Headliners", a TV program of RTHK as "low-taste or queer". He asserted that citizens can make critical remark, even against the Chief Executive, but one should do it seriously. He described the existing freedom of speech in HK as "excessive". He also remarked that no government-funded media in the world were against its government.

35. In August 1999, another top local adviser to China urged RTHK to exercise self-censorship. Tsang Hin-chi, a member of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, said it was not suitable for Cheng An-kuo, managing director of the Chung Hwa Travel Agency, Taiwan's de facto envoy, to echoed President Lee Teng-hui's comments on the "two states theory" in a radio programme of RTHK. He opined that as a government-funded broadcaster, it ought to have self-control, and mass media should not advocate secession.

36. As recognized by the SAR Government, RTHK has operated and will continue to operate with editorial independence. But what these high-ranking advisers to China have expressed aroused concerns from the public. People worried whether RTHK would become a mouthpiece of the Government under pressure and whether media can report and publish comments on sensitive topics such as the two states theory and Tibetan independence. The worry is not exaggerated in view of the attitudes of both HKSAR and Beijing Governments. When asked by HK journalists in August, Vice-Premier Qi Qichen said that under one-China principle, one could not promote or support "two-states theory" in HK, though he did not mention Cheng An-kuo or RTHK directly. Besides, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa stated that "No Chinese hopes to see independence of Taiwan". Then information coordinator Stephen Lam Shui-Lun criticized Cheng An-kuo's speech in the RTHK programme as inappropriate. We query the necessity of the Government to express its stance on Mainland-Taiwan relation in such high-profile stance

* Peaceful Assembly

Police Tactics and Conditions imposed on public rallies
37. Although the Government used the increased number of demonstrations after the handover as an indicator of its tolerance towards the exercise of civil and political rights, its control over the latter has intensified. It has been a common practice for protestors to be required to remain in "designated demonstration areas", very often far away from the targeted location, and had to protest behind heavily guarded barricades. Protesters usually find this unacceptable which often resulted in conflict, arrest and prosecution.

Prosecution of World Bank Protesters
38. The arrest and prosecution of five protestors against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was evident of the use of violence by the police to suppress freedom of expression, especially against ordinary citizens who are not well-known activists to the international community.

39. The five protesters were arrested violently during a peaceful demonstration in September 1997. They were charged of "obstructing the police" and "assaulting the police". Although the Magistrate admitted that some of the police officers had given exaggerated witness account of the event, four out of the five were still convicted on May 19, 1998.

40. Indeed, the videotape provided by a TV channel clearly showed that excessive force was exercised and the conflict was sparked by a policeman who assaulted a female protestor. It is unfair to charge the demonstrators who were just expressing their opinions on the economic invasion of the World Bank and IMF on the Third World countries. Moreover, the court only considered that the police was "executing their duties", but failed to consider whether measures taken by the police were reasonable. It is a clear evidence that judgement passed by Hong Kong courts often fail to adhere to the human rights standards. The rights to assembly and freedom of expression is often sacrificed under the cover of maintaining public order. The arrest and prosecution of young protesters threaten citizens to exercise their rights to expression or to participate in public demonstrations against social injustice. It is perceived by citizens as political means to warn off demonstrators.

Public Order Ordinance and Societies Ordinance
41. Since July 1, 1997, organizers of demonstrations are required to obtain "notification of no objection" from the police before a demonstration may proceed. Such licensing system empowered the police to object license application on national security grounds. Moreover, under guidelines issued to police, the subject matter of a demonstration, for example, whether it advocates independence for Tibet or Taiwan, can be taken into account. Thus, political conviction, rather than conduct, is made grounds for freedom of expression being restricted.

42. On the other hand, the Societies Ordinance reintroduced registration of parties and banned ties between them and foreign political groups. These laws imposed unnecessary and unjustifiable restrictions on collective expressions of citizens, especially on those voices that deviated from that of the government.

* Religious Freedom

The Pope was ban from visiting Hong Kong
43. Not only did the SAR Government reject entry of sensitive figures like Mainland dissidents and ex-Taiwan officials, it also rejected Catholic religious leader to visit Hong Kong. In August 1999, it was disclosed that the Pope has been blocked by Beijing to visit Hong Kong due to Vatican links with Taiwan. Since the Vatican maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, both the Foreign Affairs Department and the SAR Government stated that it was not appropriate for the Pope to visit HK. The chief executive also said that the Pope could not come relate to foreign policy.

44. In the eyes of Beijing Government, the Pope is a political figure and the head of Vatican. However, to local Catholics and general public the Pope is a religious and spiritual leader. The Pope's visit should be considered as a purely religious trip or a peace mission. In light of the "one country, two system" policy, there is no need for the SAR Government to politicize the Pope's visit. The Government's behavior would only lead one to query its sincerity in protecting religious freedom and commitment in maintaining the high autonomous rule of HK.

* Freedom of Association

Decline registration of Forget Not June Fourth
45. A group of activists were rejected by the Government in their application to register a group called "Forget Not June Fourth". The group submitted the application in January 1999. But police officers blocked the formation of the pro-democracy group because of a line in the constitution calling for the end of one-party rule on the mainland. In order to promote the signature campaign organised by former student activist Wang Dan, they changed the name of the group to "June Fourth Commission" and cancel the term in the constitution. As a result, application was processed successfully in a short period of time. Members of the groups said it was a political suppression and the police have denied their rights to form groups. Groups like "Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China" and "People's Constitutionalist Society" which also have such terms in their constitutions registered successfully before the handover of sovereignty. It shows the change of policy and the Government strengthens control in group formation.

Police Brutality and Abusive Use of Police Power

46. The complaints against abusive use of police were common in the past years and an independent complaint mechanism to investigate the complaints was urged to establish by various sector of the community. However, since the hand-over, there is no progress and cases were reported which indicate the abusive use of violence against suspects as well as against demonstrators.

* Torture Inflicted by Police Officers
47. Allegations of using violence like slapping, beatings, water torture towards suspects are not uncommon among officers. Four officers were jailed for torturing Yiu So-man, a drug suspect in April 1998 by pouring water into his ears, stuffing a sports shoe in his mouth and threatening to throw him from a 16th-floor balcony a year ago. Yiu claimed that he was asked to admit to the possession of drugs. When refused, he was stuffed a sports shoe in his mouth and was poured into his ears and nostrils two cans of tap water.

48. In another case, Lee Shing-tat, a 37-year old man died a day after allegedly being beaten for 20 minutes by three Police Tactical Unit officers at a busy Tai Po market. His father claimed Lee was beaten, wrongly arrested and falsely imprisoned on March 6,1995 when he refused to provide an identity card to the police. He planned to lodge a formal complaint against the police, but the next day he died in his bed of a heart attack. His father has waited more than three years to hear the outcome of a police inquiry into the death. The long delay in investigating the brutality allegations discloses the shortcomings of the complaint system.

49. Just months after four police officers were failed for torturing a former drug addict to extract confession, an 18-year old youth was found dead in custody. His family claims there were bruises on his body, but police said that they were not fatal injuries and should not have caused him to die. With the past record of using violence, suspicion by public is inevitable. The police should introduce long delayed improvement measured suggested by the Law reform Commission in 1992 Suggestions like equipping police stations with cameras so that suspects are questioned on video should be implemented immediately.

* High-volume Music to Drown Protestors on Hand-over Night
50. Regarding control over demonstrators, one case is about a complaint against the police who played Beethoven music on loudspeakers outside the hand-over ceremony venue on the hand-over night of June 30,1997, drowning out anti-Beijing protesters who were shouting slogans such as "Down with Butcher Li Peng". The Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) upheld the complaint and accused the police of using excessive power. It was disclosed that the symphony was a tactic to protect visiting mainland leaders' dignity and prevent embarrassed by hearing slogans according to the international law.

51. In the far away demonstration area, the right of demonstrators to express opinions through chanting slogans still had to be obstructed. Moreover, when complaints were filed by the protesters to the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO), the officer in charge of the incident Lee Ming-kwai was promoted to Director Management Services, a post which oversees the operation of the CAPO. The conflict of interest discloses the lack of independence of CAPO in monitoring the police force.

* Lack of Independent Complaint Mechanism
52. Indeed, CAPO has long been criticized of lacking credibility because it is a part of the police system. Officers working in CAPO come from the police force and will return to their posts in future, thus their independence and fairness are questionable. In the past, many of the cases were dropped due to lack of evidence. Among the few thousand cases of complaints in which assault allegations made up more than one-third, just a few cases were found substantiated. (please refer to table 1)

53. On the other hand, all the cases being investigated by CAPO had to be scrutinized and recorded by the IPCC. But IPCC is not a statutory organization, thus the recommendations has no binding force. As in the above-mentioned case, though IPCC accused the police of employing excessive power, and raised a number of suggestions, like asking police "to avoid tactics which may reasonably give rise to the perception that the rights of freedom of expression and of assembly and demonstration are being unnecessarily curtailed". However, there is no mechanism to ensure the implementation of these recommendations.

Results of Investigations Endorsed by the IPCC for the Years 1996, 1997 and 1998 (Table 1)

Family Reunion

54. In Hong Kong, there are approximately100,0003 split families composing of parents and their children separated between Mainland China and Hong Kong as a result of erroneous policy . Their prospect of reunion is not regulated by a reasonable queuing system but procedures that subject them to bureaucratic manipulation and corruption. Such act constitutes a violation of Article 23 of the Convention which stipulates that "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state". In light of this, we sincerely urge the Committee to pay attention to this problem and to protect the rights of these separated families.

55. Since China has adopted the open door policy in late 1970s, the number of Hong Kong single males4 returning to their homeland to get marry has grown rapidly. Nevertheless, according to existing policies, their wives and children have to stay in Mainland China to apply for One-way Entry Permits5 from the PRC Government before they are allowed to join their husbands/fathers in Hong Kong.

56. The One-way Permit system has been commonly criticized as unfair, ineffective, as well as lacking a transparent and uniform standard. Different provinces in mainland China now operate their own system to allocate their share of the 150 daily quota and the applicants have no way of knowing the eligibility of applications, the assessment criteria nor the waiting time. We understand from the PRC government that One-way Permits are not approved on family but individual basis. In most cases, mothers and children have to wait for their turns in separate queues, resulting in prolonged and unnecessarily family separation. The worst scenario is that in some parts of China, children are absolutely denied the right of application thus causing split families of a permanent nature. For the spouse queue, in some cities, applicants have to wait for at least 15 years, while in others, the waiting time can be as short as one year. For instance, in Guangdong Province, the responsible department is only processing pre-1990 applications while applications submitted by those married after 1990 are kept frozen. The affected families are not informed of the estimate period of waiting at all.

57. Worse still, the problem is aggregated by widespread corruption. Many applicants have reported that they have to pay a bribe ranging from HKD 60,000 to HKD 200,000 i.e. USD 7,692 to USD 25,641 to the responsible district officials or they run the risk of being disqualified. As a result, families who cannot afford to pay a bribe are forced to take the risks of taking dangerous and illegal entry routes to Hong Kong. In most cases, mother who have to take care of young children have no alternatives but to turn to smugglers to bring them to Hong Kong while young children who needs motherly care are also subject to the risk of illegal entry from Mainland China.

58. We are concerned with the detrimental effects of long term separation on the affected families. Not only marital relationship suffers, but also children's normal development is seriously affected due to deprivation of parental care and nurture. Mothers are often imbued with a sense of guilt that they cannot fulfill their roles as wife and mother while their young children's physical and emotional development are adversely hampered by the prolonged separation.

59. We are disappointed that both the HKSAR Government and the Chinese Government overlook the problems of the One-way Entry Permit system. We are alarmed at the lack of active cooperation and coordination between the two Governments to improve the existing system.

Recommendations
60. We strongly urge the Committee to express concerns over the independence of judiciary

61. We strongly urge the Committee to express concerns over the gradual erosion of rights guaranteed by the ICCPR and Basic Law by mainland regulations and action, such that freedom of expression, assembly and association of the Hong Kong citizens can be protected

62. We strongly urge the Committee to request the Hong Kong SAR government to reform the election system that the Chief Executive and all members of the Legislature should be selected by universal and equal suffrage

63. We strongly urge the Committee to request the Hong Kong SAR government to establish an independent compliant mechanism to monitor and prevent police brutality and to issue guideline embodying a proper balance between upholding human rights and public security for police officers to follow

64. We strongly urge the Committee to show concern over the immigration practice that politicizes and interferes with religious activity and academic freedom as reflected in the decline of the Pope's visit to Hong Kong and the rejection of visa to dissidents or Taiwan scholars.

65. We strongly urge the Committee to show concern over the HKSAR government's concern over administrative convenience and public pressure to supercede the constitutionally guaranteed right of abode of children born of Hong Kong parents

66. We strongly urge the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government and the People's Republic of China Government to have better coordination to ensure that One-way Entry Permits are approved on a family basis , so as to allow mothers and children to settle in Hong Kong at the same time.

67. We strongly urge the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government and the People's Republic of China Government to ensure the transparency of the criteria and procedure of the migration applications. It is essential that monitoring mechanism be built into the system to enable public scrutiny and sanction.

1 See the Annex II of the Basic Law on the "Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures."
2 In the 1995 municipal council elections, 32 among the 41 members of the Urban Council and 27 among the 39 members of the Regional Council were returned by geographical constituencies.
3 The figure is extracted from the "Special Topics Report No.22, Hong Kong residents with spouses/children in the mainland of China" from the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, July 1999. It is estimated that there are 100,000 spouses and 86,000 children aged below 20 waiting in the mainland China to come to Hong Kong.
4 Most of these single males emigrated from mainland China to Hong Kong illegally or legally for political or economical causes in the past.
5 The system of One-way Entry Permit is an emigration policy administered by the mainland authorities. It governs the migration of Chinese citizens to Hong Kong, whether or not they have the right of abode in Hong Kong.
HKHRC Report to the UNHRC on the Report of the HKSAR of the PRC in the light of the ICCPR (October 1999)